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1  Essentialism about Natural Kinds
Essentialism about natural kinds has three tenets. The first tenet is that all 
and only members of a natural kind have some essential properties. The 
second tenet is that these essential properties play a causal role. The third 
tenet is that they are explanatorily relevant. I examine the prospects of 
questioning these tenets and point out that arguing against the first and 
the second tenets of kind-essentialism would involve taking part in some 
of the grand debates of philosophy. But, at least if we restrict the scope 
of the discussion to the biological domain, the third tenet of kind- 
essentialism could be questioned more successfully.
It is not an easy task to pin down what is meant by essentialism about 
natural kinds (Putnam 1975; Kripke 1980). First, one can be essentialist 
about individuals and about kinds. I will not say anything here about 
essentialism regarding individuals. Maybe, as Kripke claims, specific indi-
viduals have essential properties, maybe not (on this important and 
complex question, see, for example, Robertson 1998; Hawthorne and 
Gendler 2000; Matthen 2003). Essentialism about individuals is logically 
independent from essentialism about kinds (see also Okasha 2002, 192). 
The question I am interested in is whether natural kinds have essential 
properties.
Second, there are a number of potential definitions for essentialism 
about kinds. As I intend to argue against essentialism, I will use the most 
general of these. Richard Boyd identified a widespread and fairly strong 
version of essentialism, according to which natural kinds “must possess 
definitional essences that define them in terms of necessary and suffi-
cient, intrinsic, unchanging, ahistorical properties” (Boyd 1999, 146). 
Essential properties in, say, chemistry may all be intrinsic, unchanging, 
and ahistorical. But it is not clear that all essential properties need to 
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satisfy any of these three requirements. In fact, a rather easy way of 
arguing against essentialism about at least some natural kinds—namely, 
biological kinds—is to point out that biological properties are extrinsic, 
historical, and change over time since biological entities are evolving 
over time. But it is unlikely that arguments of this kind will defeat essen-
tialism about biological, natural kinds. A new wave of biological essential-
ists all seek to specify essential properties of biological kinds that are 
extrinsic, and yet are neither unchanging nor ahistorical.1 The simple 
argument from the observation that biological entities are evolving 
over time cannot be used to argue against these versions of biological 
essentialism.
Thus, if we want a target that is worth arguing against, we need to 
weaken this strong definition of essentialism. As most of the new essential-
ists, I am also happy to go along with David Hull’s characterization, accord-
ing to which “each species is distinguished by one set of essential 
characteristics. The possession of each essential character is necessary for 
membership in the species, and the possession of all the essential charac-
ters sufficient” (1994, 313). I will use Hull’s definition as my starting point 
for characterizing kind-essentialism in what follows.2
Third, essentialism about kinds is a complex thesis that goes beyond 
the simple claim that there are some properties that all and only members 
of a natural kind have in all possible worlds. Marc Ereshefsky specified 
three tenets of any version of essentialism about kinds:
One tenet is that all and only the members of a kind have a common essence. A 
second tenet is that the essence of a kind is responsible for the traits typically associ-
ated with the members of that kind. For example, gold’s atomic structure is respon-
sible for gold’s disposition to melt at certain temperatures. Third, knowing a kind’s 
essence helps us explain and predict those properties typically associated with a 
kind. (Ereshefsky 2007, sec. 2.1)
Most philosophers who, like Ereshefsky, argue against essentialism, only 
consider the first tenet. Proponents of essentialism also tend to be con-
cerned only with this first tenet. In contrast, I would like to focus on the 
second and especially the third tenet.
My claim is that questioning the second or third tenets may be a more 
promising way of resisting kind-essentialism. In short, a promising and so 
far almost completely unexplored anti-essentialist strategy would be to say 
that even if it turns out that “all and only the members of a kind have a 
common essence,” this essence is unlikely to play any significant causal or 
explanatory role.
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The plan for the essay is simple: I go through the three tenets of essen-
tialism and explore which of them would be the easiest to question. My 
final response will be that arguing against the first and the second tenets 
of kind-essentialism would involve taking part in some of the grand debates 
of philosophy. But at least if we restrict the scope of the discussion to the 
biological domain, the third tenet of kind-essentialism could be questioned 
more successfully.
2  Questioning the First Tenet: All and Only the Members of a Kind 
Have a Common Essence
I am not sure that the question whether “all and only the members of a 
kind have a common essence” can be settled. A rather straightforward way 
of arguing against the first tenet would be to use some general metaphysi-
cal considerations. The first tenet of kind-essentialism states that all 
and only members of a kind have a certain essential property: an essence. 
The crucial point is that ‘property’ here means “property-type.” The set 
of essential properties that defines natural kinds is a set of essential 
property-types. The instantiation of each essential property-type is neces-
sary for membership in the natural kind and the instantiation of all the 
essential property-types is sufficient. I pause to make the distinction 
between property-types and property-instances explicit.
The term ‘property’ is ambiguous. It can mean universals: properties 
that can be present in two (or more) distinct individuals at the same time. 
But it can also mean tropes: abstract particulars that are logically incapable 
of being present in two (or more) distinct individuals at the same time 
(Williams 1953; Campbell 1981, 1990; Schaffer 2001; Simons 1994; Sanford 
manuscript).
Suppose that the color of my neighbor’s black car and my black car are 
indistinguishable. They still have different tropes. The blackness trope of 
my car is different from the blackness trope of my neighbor’s car. These 
two tropes are similar but numerically distinct. Thus, the blackness of my 
car and the blackness of my neighbor’s car are different properties.
If, in contrast, we interpret properties as universals—or as I will refer to 
them, as property-types—then the two cars instantiate the very same 
property-type: blackness. Thus, depending on which notion of property 
we talk about, we have to give different answers to the question about 
whether the color-property of the two cars is the same or different. If by 
‘property’ we mean “trope,” then my car has a different (but similar) 
color-property—that is, color-trope—from my neighbor’s. If, however, by 
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‘property’ we mean “property-type,” then my car has the very same 
property—that is, property-type—as my neighbor’s.
In the light of this distinction, the first tenet of essentialism about 
natural kinds can be broken down to the conjunction of two claims: (a) 
property-types exist, and (b) some property-types are essential property-
types. Many anti-essentialist arguments question (b) while accepting (a) 
(e.g., Hull 1986, as far as the biological domain is concerned). I will focus 
on the more radical strategy of questioning (a) because, in sections 5 and 
6, I will argue that (at least in the domain of biology) a strategy quite 
similar to this may be used in order to argue not against the first, but 
against the third tenet of essentialism about natural kinds.
As the first tenet of kind-essentialism states that all and only members 
of a kind have a certain essential property-type, a straightforward way of 
arguing against this tenet is to question (a): to show that property-types 
do not exist and hence, a fortiori, essential property-types do not exist 
either. In other words, if we accept a version of nominalism, then there is 
a simple way of resisting any version of essentialism about natural kinds. 
If only particulars exist and property-types do not, then how could we 
even formulate essentialism about natural kinds?
This would be a simple and straightforward argument against essential-
ism about natural kinds, but it is not clear that we have any reason to 
accept its main premise: that property-types do not exist. The grand debate 
between nominalism and realism is one of the oldest in philosophy and 
it has definitely not been resolved. Taking for granted the premise that 
there are no property-types would significantly weaken an anti-essentialist 
argument in the eyes of those who are not fully convinced by nominalist 
considerations.
Further, we need to be a bit more careful about what version of trope 
nominalism the anti-essentialist strategy I outlined above needs to endorse. 
Many trope-nominalist accounts define property-types as sets or resem-
blance-classes of tropes. Thus, according to these accounts, although the 
existence of property-types in some sense reduces to the existence of tropes 
(and, as a result, in some sense they are not “real”), they do have mind-
independent existence: there is a fact of the matter about whether a trope 
subsumes under a certain set or resemblance-class.
The version of trope nominalism that would be needed to question (a) 
needs to be more radical than this: it cannot allow for there being a fact 
of the matter about whether a trope subsumes under a certain set or 
resemblance-class. If it did allow for this, then the essentialist view could 
be rephrased in terms of “essential” sets or “essential” resemblance-classes 
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of tropes. In order to block (a), the trope nominalist needs to claim that 
property-types are just our ways of grouping tropes: they do not have 
mind-independent existence (Nanay 2009, 2010a, 2011). But this is an 
even more controversial assumption for an anti-essentialist argument to 
rely on.
But even if such a version of trope nominalism is a dubious premise to 
build our argument on, perhaps if we restrict the scope of our argument 
to the biological domain then the first tenet could be questioned 
successfully.
3  Questioning the First Tenet of Kind-Essentialism in the Biological 
Domain
Biology has always been considered to be a problem case for essentialism 
or at least a potential exemption. According to the traditional “anti- 
essentialist consensus” (Okasha 2002, 195; Walsh 2006, 325) among biolo-
gists and philosophers of biology, at least regarding biological kinds, 
essentialism is false (Dupré 1993, 2002; Hull 1965; Ghiselin 1974; Hacking 
2007). Putnam and Kripke may be right about chemical kinds, but biolo-
gical kinds do not have (and cannot have) any essential properties 
(Wilkerson 1995; Ellis 2001).
But over the last several years, more and more philosophers have argued 
for a version of essentialism about biological kinds. Paul Griffiths, for 
example, argues that biological kinds have “essential relational properties”—
not essential intrinsic properties—and claims that if we accept that essen-
tial properties can be relational, then all the traditional considerations 
against essentialism about biological kinds lose their appeal (Griffiths 
1999). (For a similar claim, see Okasha 2002. The idea of using relational 
properties for defining biological kinds, not necessarily in an essentialist 
manner, comes from Matthen 1998; Millikan 1999; and Elder 1995.) Denis 
Walsh goes even further and claims that “recent evolutionary developmen-
tal biology provides compelling evidence” for essentialism (2006, 425).
In order to assess the merits of this new wave of essentialism about 
biological kinds, the traditional anti-essentialist arguments need to be 
reevaluated. There are anti-essentialist arguments that prove to be incon-
clusive. One such argument concerning essentialism about biological 
kinds, is the following (Hull 1965; for objections, see Sober 1980, 356; 
Okasha 2002, 195–196; Walsh 2006, 431). According to evolutionary 
theory, the present species have evolved from ancestral ones. Thus, species 
cannot have essences, as they are clearly capable of changing. This 
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argument may be taken to jeopardize a version of essentialism, one that 
takes kinds to be unchangeable, but it does not apply in the case of other 
versions of essentialism.
Some other anti-essentialist considerations are not obviously inconclu-
sive. The most important of these are based on the concept of “population 
thinking.” Since using population thinking to argue against essentialism 
shares some important features with my own argument against the third 
tenet of essentialism in sections 5 and 6, I will spend some time trying 
to understand what population thinking is supposed to mean, and why it 
is assumed to be an effective weapon in the fight against essentialism.
Population thinking has traditionally been the main consideration 
against essentialism about biological kinds. The strategy of philosophers 
with anti-essentialist convictions about biology has been to point out that 
since population thinking implies anti-essentialism and population think-
ing is the right way of thinking about biology, we have to be anti-essen-
tialist about biology.
This strategy can be attacked at two points. First, the essentialist could 
argue that population thinking is not the right attitude to take toward the 
biological domain. No philosophers or biologists seem to take this route. 
The second way of attacking the anti-essentialist strategy would be to deny 
that population thinking implies anti-essentialism. And in fact, with the 
rise of contemporary attempts to bring essentialism back in the domain of 
biology, it has been repeatedly argued that population thinking does not 
exclude essentialism. Thus, one can endorse population thinking and still 
agree with Putnam and Kripke about the essential properties of biological 
kinds.
All of the recent attempts to resurrect essentialism about biological 
kinds find it important to show that their version of essentialism is con-
sistent with population thinking (Walsh 2006, 432–433; Okasha 2002, 
195–196). Paul Griffiths says explicitly that “it would be quite consistent 
to be a Darwinian [population-thinking] essentialist, given the right choice 
of essential properties” (Griffiths 1999, 210). Or, more explicitly: “Popula-
tion thinking excludes essential intrinsic properties, but it does not exclude 
essential relational properties” (ibid.; cf. Okasha 2002). Whether these 
attempts to carve out an essentialist way of construing population thinking 
succeed depends on the way we interpret population thinking. Conversely, 
whether population thinking really gives us some reason to have doubts 
about essentialism about biological kinds also depends on the way we 
interpret population thinking. As both proponents and opponents of 
essentialism about biological kinds seem to rely on population thinking in 
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their arguments, it is important to examine what population thinking is 
and what it implies.
My claim is that Ernst Mayr’s influential idea of what makes the biologi-
cal domain special, the idea of “population thinking,” could, and should, 
be interpreted as a version of trope nominalism (Nanay 2010a). Here is 
Mayr’s characterization of population thinking from 1959: “Individuals, or 
any kind of organic entities, form populations of which we can determine 
only the arithmetic mean and the statistics of variation. Averages are 
merely statistical abstractions; only the individuals of which the popula-
tions are composed have reality” (Mayr 1959, 326). Mayr contrasts popula-
tion thinking with typological thinking, according to which “there are a 
limited number of fixed, unchangeable ‘ideas’ underlying the observed 
variability, with the eidos (idea) being the only thing that is fixed and real, 
while the observed variability has no . . . reality” (ibid.). The contrast Mayr 
makes is a very sharp one: population thinking and typological thinking 
are exclusive of each other (ibid., 326–327).
Mayr’s distinction between typological and population thinking may 
appear straightforward, but in fact it could be (and has been) interpreted 
in at least two ways. First, population thinking could be interpreted as an 
ontological claim about entities: only the individual is real, everything else 
is abstraction. There are various problems with this reading. If only the 
individual is real, then populations and species should be thought of as 
groups of individuals which, as groups, lack reality themselves. This would 
make much of post-Darwinian biology nonsensical from the population 
thinker’s point of view. As Elliott Sober says:
If [as Mayr claims] “only the individuals of which the populations are composed 
have reality,” it would appear that much of population biology has its head in the 
clouds. The Lotka-Volterra equations, for example, describe the interactions of 
predator and prey populations. Presumably, population thinking, properly so called, 
must allow that there is something real over and above individual organisms. [It 
does not] embody a resolute and ontologically austere focus on individual organisms 
alone. (Sober 1980, 352)
Even more problematic for this reading is the fact that Mayr himself is 
certainly not nominalist about populations and species (Mayr 1942, 120; 
Mayr 1963, 19). His dictum that “only the individuals . . . have reality” 
seems to flatly contradict his famous “biological species concept” which 
indeed attributes reality to populations and species. It is tempting to 
resolve this seeming contradiction by dismissing Mayr’s claim about the 
importance of the individual in evolution as an exaggeration or even as 
“rather silly metaphysics” (Ariew 2008, 2).3
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Elliott Sober chooses this route when he says that “describing a single 
individual is as theoretically peripheral to a populationist as describing the 
motion of a single molecule is to the kinetic theory of gases. In this impor-
tant sense, population thinking involves ignoring individuals” (Sober 1980, 
370). The conclusion he draws is that “population thinking endows indi-
vidual organisms with more reality and with less reality than typological 
thinking attributes to them” (Sober 1980, 371).
This conclusion prompted some to be “a little confused about which 
one, individuals or populations, are real” (Ariew 2008, 8). It also opened 
up the concept of population thinking to many diverging interpretations, 
some of which seems to contradict Mayr’s original claims (Walsh 2006, 
432–433; Griffiths 1999, 209–210).
I argue that population thinking is an ontological claim about properties 
and not about entities. It is indeed a version of nominalism. However, it 
is not nominalism about entities, but about properties. In other words, 
Mayr advocated a version of trope nominalism: for the population thinker, 
only the property-instances, that is, tropes, are real. Property-types are 
not real.
We have to be careful when formulating this claim. The population 
thinker presumably would not deny that groups of individual organisms 
do have properties and that these properties are real. A population of 431 
geese has the property of having the population size of 431, for example, 
and this property seems very real indeed. The distinction I am making (and 
the distinction I believe Mayr was making) is not one between the proper-
ties of individuals and the properties of populations. Rather, it is between 
individual property-instances (or tropes) and property-types (or universals) 
that can be instantiated in many different entities. In short, the population 
thinker can acknowledge the existence of populations and species. These 
entities are real in the same way as individuals are real. And all of these 
entities have very real property-instances or tropes. What the population 
thinker denies is that there are property-types.
My claim is that Mayr’s provocative statement, according to which 
“averages are merely statistical abstractions; only the individuals of which 
the populations are composed have reality” should be read as “property-
types are merely statistical abstractions; only the tropes of individuals (or 
of populations) have reality.” Mayr’s population thinking is a version of 
trope nominalism (see esp. Mayr 1959, 326, where he talks about the 
uniqueness of features, i.e., properties, and not the uniqueness of indi-
vidual entities).4
We can now put together an argument against the first tenet of kind-
essentialism in the biological domain: (i) Population thinking is the right 
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way of thinking about the biological domain. (ii) Population thinking 
implies trope nominalism. (iii) Trope nominalism implies anti-essentialism 
about biological kinds. I have presented some considerations in favor of 
(ii) and (iii), but as yet have said nothing that would make us accept (i): 
that population thinking, that is, trope nominalism, would be the right 
way of thinking about the biological domain. And I am not sure what 
argument could be given in favor of (i), besides appealing to the authority 
of Ernst Mayr—without this premise, the argument collapses.
In section 6, I will give an argument for the claim that biological 
property-types play no explanatory role in evolutionary explanations. 
Could we use this argument to establish (i)? Mayr’s claim is much stronger 
than mine, as he denies the reality (not merely the explanatory relevance) 
of biological property-types: he claims that they are merely our statistical 
abstractions.
Yet, depending on one’s meta-metaphysical convictions, there may not 
be such a huge difference between these two versions of trope nominalism: 
Mayr’s stronger version and the weaker “explanatory trope nominalism”  
I will argue for below. One could, after all, use the weaker claim that biolo-
gical property-types are explanatorily superfluous and, with the help of the 
principle of parsimony, conclude that we have no reason to postulate their 
existence.
But not everyone will find this last step unproblematic, and I do not 
want to argue that it is unproblematic. If someone believes that we can 
infer from the fact that something is explanatorily superfluous that it does 
not exist (as Mayr may have believed), then she will not find the distinc-
tion between my “explanatory trope nominalism” and Mayr’s population 
thinking a very interesting one. She will probably not find the distinction 
between the first and the third tenet of kind-essentialism a meaningful one 
either. But if someone does not believe that explanatory irrelevance implies 
non-existence, then she will still have no reason to accept (i) and hence 
to accept the population-thinking inspired rejection of the first tenet of 
essentialism about biological kinds.
The argument I considered in this section was unsuccessful in the end. 
But I will use its conceptual framework in the hopefully more successful 
argument against the third tenet of kind-essentialism, in sections 5 and 6.
4  Questioning the Second Tenet: Causal Responsibility
The second tenet of kind-essentialism is about causal responsibility. As 
Ereshefsky says, “a kind’s essence causes the other properties associated 
with that kind. The essence of the natural kind gold, for example, is gold’s 
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atomic structure. . . . the atomic structure of gold causes pieces of gold to 
have the properties associated with that kind, such as dissolving in certain 
acids and conducting electricity” (forthcoming, 1).
What we say about this second tenet depends on what we say about 
the relata and properties of (singular) causation. If one holds that property-
types play a role in (singular) causation, then the second tenet of essential-
ism remains unscratched. But if one holds that property-types play no 
causal role—maybe because no properties play any causal role (Davidson 
1967, 1970), or maybe because only property-instances (or tropes) play any 
causal role (Ehring 1997; Nanay 2009)—then we have reason to doubt the 
second tenet. But let us go through these considerations more slowly.
The question is whether property-types play any role in causation. The 
first clarification we need to make when answering this question is whether 
it is about general or singular causation. Property-types play a clear and 
important role in general causal claims. If Fs cause Gs, then there is a pro-
perty, in virtue of which Fs cause Gs: a property all Fs have in common 
(that is, a property-type all Fs have an instantiation of) and that, pre-
sumably, can account for why Fs cause Gs. But it is unclear whether 
property-types play a role in singular causation, and it could be argued that 
questions about causal relevance are questions about singular, not general, 
causation.
There are two ways in which property-types can play a causal role. First, 
they may be part of what specifies the relata of causation. It is not clear 
what the relata of causation are. They may be events (Davidson 1967), facts 
(Mellor 1995), states of affairs (Armstrong 1997) or maybe tropes (Ehring 
1997). Facts (or Kimian events) are specified in terms of property-types. 
Thus, if we accept that these are the relata of causation, then property-types 
will be causally relevant. But if we hold that the relata of causation are 
Davidsonian events or tropes, then property-types play no role in the 
specification of the relata of causation. Thus, we have no prima facie reason 
to accept that they are causally relevant.
But even if we take (Davidsonian) events to be the relata of causation, 
a further question arises: what is it in virtue of which one event causes 
another? First, the obvious answer would be that an event causes another 
event in virtue of having an instantiation of a property-type: the sleeping 
pill I took last night made me fall asleep in virtue of some chemical 
property-type it had an instantiation of. If we accept this answer, then 
property-types will be very relevant causally.
But there are other ways of answering this “in virtue” question. Donald 
Davidson famously denied that events cause other events in virtue of any 
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properties. As he memorably said: “If causal relations and causal powers 
inhere in particular events and objects, then the way those events and 
objects are described, and the properties we happen to employ to pick 
them out or characterize them, cannot affect what they cause. Naming the 
American invasion of Panama ‘Operation Just Cause’ does not alter the 
consequences of the event” (Davidson 1993, 8). In other words, properties 
play no role in causal relations—although they may be very important in 
causal explanations. Another, less radical, way of denying that events cause 
other events in virtue of having instantiations of certain property-types 
would be to say that events cause other events in virtue of having tropes. 
Properties, if what we mean by that is tropes, do play an important role in 
causation: events cause other events in virtue of them. But property-types 
do not play any role (Robb 1997; Nanay 2009).
If we accept the Davidsonian or the trope answer to the “in virtue” 
question, then we can conclude that property-types are not causally 
relevant. But if property-types are not causally relevant, then essential 
property-types are not causally relevant either. But the second tenet of 
essentialism was that essences—that is, essential property-types—must be 
causally relevant. So, as in the case of the first tenet, we have a simple 
argument against kind-essentialism.
Note, however, that this argument rests on three heavily contested 
premises about the nature of causation; in order to run this argument, we 
need to make three important assumptions. First, we need to take singular, 
and not general, causation to be where causal relevance lies. Second, we 
need to take the relata of causation to be (Davidsonian) events (or tropes). 
And finally, we need to hold that events cause other events in virtue of 
having tropes (and not in virtue of having instantiations of property-
types), or we need to endorse a Davidsonian view on the properties of 
causation. Few people hold all of these premises. Hence, as in the case of 
the argument against the first tenet of kind-essentialism, this argument is 
also based on premises concerning the nature of causal relations that many 
would question from the start.
5  Questioning the Third Tenet: Explanatory Relevance
The third tenet of kind-essentialism was the following: “Knowing the 
essence of a kind . . . allows us to predict and explain the properties associ-
ated with the members of a kind. For instance, the atomic structure of gold 
provides the basis for explaining why gold conducts electricity, and it 
allows us to predict that a particular chunk of gold will conduct electricity” 
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(Ereshefsky, forthcoming, 1). Or as Philip Kitcher puts it, “natural kinds 
are distinguished by some special underlying feature that explains the 
behavior of members of this kind—like atomic number, for example, in 
the case of the elements” (Kitcher 2007, 294; Dupré 2002, 176–181; Wilson 
et al. forthcoming). (See Platts 1983 for a classic summary and Okasha 
2002, 203 for some critical remarks.) If we can show that this third tenet 
of essentialism is unjustified, then we have a good way of arguing against 
essentialism per se.
As in the case of the first and second tenets, I find it unlikely that we 
can give a general argument against the third tenet—any such argument 
would need to presuppose a rather specific and, as a result, heavily con-
tested theory of explanation. But I do think that at least as far as the 
biological domain is concerned, we are in a good position to question the 
third tenet.
We have seen that it is unlikely that we would find some strong reason 
to reject the very idea that biological property-types are “real.” But we may 
be able to find an argument for the claim that biological property-types 
play no explanatory role in biology. They may be “real” and exist inde-
pendently of us, but if they are explanatorily superfluous, this is enough 
to undermine the third tenet of essentialism about biological kinds. I will 
give an argument in favor of this claim in the next section.
6  Questioning the Third Tenet of Kind-Essentialism in the Biological 
Domain
My claim is that property-types are explanatorily superfluous in evolution-
ary explanations. All the explanatory work is done by property-instances. 
This claim needs to be clarified and qualified at a number of points. 
First, I want to remain silent about whether property-types play any 
explanatory role in non-biological, non-evolutionary explanations. Maybe 
they do. When we are trying to explain why a certain gold sample melts 
at 1,948° F, we can explain this by referring to a property-type all gold 
samples have an instantiation of (maybe the property-type of having a 
certain atomic structure). In this explanation, we have a property-type as 
part of the explanans. The property-type may or may not be causally rel-
evant, but it is explanatorily relevant. My claim is that this is not the 
case in evolutionary explanations, where the explanans refers only to 
property-instances.
Second, it is important to note that I do not claim that using tropes 
instead of property-types in the metaphysical framework increases the 
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explanatory power of evolutionary theory. After all, it has been argued, 
convincingly, that statements about tropes and statements about instantia-
tions of property-types are notional variants: one can always be rephrased 
in terms of the other (Daly 1997). All I claim is that adding biological 
property-types to a trope nominalist metaphysical framework does not 
increase the explanatory power of evolutionary theory. Hence, property-
types are explanatorily superfluous.
I said that in the domain of biology, property-types do not do any 
explanatory work and property-instances do all the work. An important 
clarification about this claim: I talked about the biological domain, biologi-
cal property-types and biological tropes. But it is not clear where the 
boundaries of the biological domain lie. Is DNA part of the biological 
domain or is it already part of the domain of chemistry? Also, there are 
many different kinds of explanation (Van Fraassen 1980). Saying that 
property-types play no role in any of them would be a difficult claim to 
argue for. So I will restrict the scope of my claim in the following manner: 
property-types play no role in evolutionary explanations. When I talk 
about the explanatory role (or lack thereof) biological property-types play, 
what I mean is explanatory role in an evolutionary explanation. Biological 
kinds are evolved kinds and biological entities are evolved entities. Thus, 
if a property-type is supposed to play some explanatory role in biology, 
like the atomic structure of gold explains why it melts at certain tempera-
ture, then, as the explanation of the properties of evolved entities is an 
evolutionary explanation, this means that this property-type is supposed 
to play at least some role in evolutionary explanations. I will attempt to 
show that this is not so: no property-type plays any role in evolutionary 
explanations.5
Let us go back to what the third tenet of essentialism entails. Ereshef-
sky’s example is that “the atomic structure of gold provides the basis for 
explaining why gold conducts electricity, and it allows us to predict that 
a particular chunk of gold will conduct electricity” (Ereshefsky, forthcom-
ing, p. 1). Philip Kitcher uses a similar example: “natural kinds are distin-
guished by some special underlying feature that explains the behavior of 
members of this kind – like atomic number, for example, in the case of the 
elements” (Kitcher 2007, p. 294). They both take their examples from 
chemistry. But what would be the equivalent of these claims in biology?
What is important from our point of view is that both Ereshefsky and 
Kitcher talks about the explanation of the behavior of a particular token 
member of the kind (or a token chunk of gold). Hence, in the domain of 
biology, an essential property would need to be able to explain why specific 
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token organisms have the traits they do. And, luckily, a lot has been written 
about exactly this kind of explanation.
In fact, one of the most important recent debates in philosophy of 
biology is about whether natural selection can explain why specific organ-
isms have the traits they have. The view that selection can play a role in 
explaining why organisms have the traits they have, has been defended 
by Karen Neander (1995a,b; see also Millikan 1990; Nanay 2005, 2010b; 
Matthen 1999). On the other side of the trench the central figure is Elliott 
Sober (1984a, 1995; see also Walsh 1998; Dretske 1988, 1990; Pust 2001; 
Lewens 2001; Cummins 1975; and Stegmann 2010).
Sober claims that selection is a negative force: it does not create; it only 
destroys (Sober 1984a, chapter 5). Random mutations create a variety of 
traits (or genetic plans) and selection eliminates some of these, but the 
explanation of the traits of one of these individuals is provided by random 
mutation and inheritance (and some developmental factors), not by the 
elimination process. Selection can explain why certain individuals were 
eliminated and it may also explain why a trait is present (or widespread) 
in a population, but it cannot explain the traits of specific individuals that 
were not eliminated.
Karen Neander argues against the validity of this argument, at least as 
far as cumulative selection is concerned (Neander 1995a). After a couple 
of rounds of exchanges without any sign of rapprochement, one gets the 
sense that there is some sort of miscommunication between Neander and 
Sober. One gets the sense that the opponents and the advocates of this 
argument may not mean the same by the term ‘selection’.
My aim here is not to decide who is right in this debate (I attempted 
to do this in Nanay 2005 and Nanay 2010b). My aim is to show that 
regardless of which of these two views about the explanatory power 
of selection we accept, we can conclude that property-types do not 
play any role in explaining why token organisms have the token traits 
they have.
Take Sober’s position first. He has argued repeatedly that the theory of 
natural selection can only be formulated with the help of property-types, 
that is, property types play a very important role in the theory of natural 
selection (most explicitly in Sober 1981, but also in Sober 1980 and Sober 
1984). As he says in a paper co-authored with Richard Lewontin: “selection 
theory is about genotypes not genotokens” (Sober-Lewontin 1982, p. 172; 
see also Sober-Lewontin 1983, p. 649). And even more explicitly: “to under-
stand what it means to talk about the selection of genes, organisms, or 
groups, one must quantify over properties” (Sober 1981, p. 162).
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This may sound like bad news for my claim that property-types do not 
play a role in explaining why token organisms have the traits they have, 
but remember that Sober maintains that what explains why token organ-
isms have the traits they have is not selection. What does this explanatory 
work, according to Sober is random mutation and inheritance (and, pre-
sumably, some developmental factors) (Sober 1995). And mutation, inheri-
tance and development should be taken to be token phenomena here: the 
mutation in a token ancestor of the organism, inheritance from one token 
organism to another and the developmental processes of the organism are 
all processes that operate on token traits. In short, if we take Sober’s side 
in the grand debate about the explanatory power of selection, we can 
conclude that property-types do not play any role in explaining why spe-
cific token organisms have the traits they have.
But what if we take Neander’s side, who claims that cumulative selection 
does explain why specific token organisms have the traits they have? Here, 
the answer is more complicated. First, it is important to note that Neander’s 
claim is that cumulative selection can explain why specific token organisms 
have the traits they have. And here is what she means by cumulative selec-
tion: what makes cumulative selection cumulative: that “the probable 
outcome of future [rounds of selection] depends on the results of previous 
[rounds of selection] (Neander 1995b, p. 584).
It could be pointed out that this conception is much stronger than what 
Sober means by cumulative selection (most famously in his discussion of 
the ‘selection toy’ [Sober 1984, p. 99])—and this may explain the miscom-
munication between Sober and Neander. But what is important from the 
point of view of the present argument is that Neander’s way of interpreting 
cumulative selection does not presuppose any talk of property-types. Take 
the (uniparental) organism, a, whose neck is 12 cm long. It has two off-
spring, b and c, with 14 and 10 cm long neck, respectively. As organism b 
gets to reach branches with leaves that organism c cannot, it gets to 
survive, whereas organism c starves to death. Organism b also has two 
offspring, d and e, with 16 and 12 cm long neck and d survives, whereas 
e starves to death. This is cumulative selection in Neander’s sense: the traits 
of the organisms change from generation to generation, not just the trait 
frequencies. Further, the fact that b survives and c dies influences neck size 
of the next generation. As it is b (and not c) who gets to survive, the start-
ing point for the variation in neck size for the next generation is 14 cm 
(and not 10 cm).
This way of thinking about cumulative selection explains the token 
traits of specific organisms in terms of past selection of token traits. It 
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explains why organism d has such a long neck by pointing out that d’s 
parent, b had longer neck than c and got to survive as a result. The differ-
ence between traits that are responsible for the death of some organisms 
and the survival of others is a difference between token traits of specific 
organisms (i.e., the difference between b’s 14 cm long neck and c’s 10 cm 
long neck) and not a difference between abstract trait types.
A possible objection: Couldn’t we refer to the trait tokens of specific 
organisms as instantiations of a trait type, say, the trait type of being 12 
cm long? We could, but this would have very problematic consequences. 
An instantiation of the trait type of being 12 cm long was responsible for 
a’s survival, but another instantiation of the same trait type is responsible 
for e’s death (whose neck is also 12 cm long). Hence, it would be problem-
atic to take what is responsible for the death or survival of organisms to 
be trait types, because instantiations of the very same trait type are respon-
sible for death in one generation and survival in another. What is respon-
sible for the death of e and the survival of a are not trait types, but trait 
tokens (see Nanay 2010a for a more detailed version of this argument as 
well as for some clarifications that I could not include here).
But then this way of thinking about selection does not appeal to any 
property-types. Hence, if selection, interpreted in this way, can explain 
why specific token organisms are the way they are, then it is still true that 
property-types do not explain why specific token organisms are the way 
they are. Regardless of which side of the debate over the explanatory power 
of selection we choose, it remains true that property-types do not play any 
explanatory role in explaining why specific token organisms are the way 
they are.
Of course not all evolutionary explanations are selective explanations. I 
was focusing on the explanatory role of selection above, but similar argu-
ments could be given with regards to non-selective evolutionary processes, 
such as the founding effect. Like selection, founding effect can also be fully 
accounted for by individual level processes, such as the specific evolution-
ary history of specific organism, without appealing to any trait types. 
Thus, we have no reason to attribute any explanatory role to any 
property-type.6
My conclusion is then that even if we do not have any reason to deny 
that there may be some properties, that is, property-types, that all and only 
members of a biological kind possess in all possible worlds, if the argument 
I presented in this section is correct, we need to conclude that these prop-
erties, that is, property-types, although they may exist, play no explanatory 
role for the simple reason that no property-type plays any explanatory role 
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in the biological domain. Thus, essentialism about biological kinds fails 
not because of the first (or the second), but because of the third tenet. The 
problem is not with the existence of essential property-types, but with their 
explanatory role.7
The conclusion, then, is that we should be skeptical about the third 
tenet of kind-essentialism in the biological domain. Putnam and Kripke 
may be right about chemical kinds, but essentialism is unlikely to be the 
correct view about biological kinds.
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Notes
1. Griffiths 1999; Boyd 1999; Okasha 2002. See Walsh 2006 and Devitt 2008 for 
a different way of resurrecting essentialism about natural kinds, and Ereshefsky 
(Manuscript) for objections to both projects.
2. There may be ways of weakening essentialism even more by denying that essen-
tialism implies that all and only the members of a kind must have a kind-specific 
essence (Boyd 1999). I will say a bit more, in sections 5 and 6, about the relevance 
to such accounts of the argument I present in this paper.
3. It is worth noting that one way of defending Mayr’s position from worries of this 
kind would be to embrace the recently popular view that populations are individuals 
and members of populations are the parts of this individual (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 
1978).
4. It is also worth noting that as Mayr considers property-types as “merely statistical 
abstractions,” he denies that they have mind-independent existence—they do not 
have “reality,” as he puts it. So Mayr’s version of trope nominalism is of the radical 
kind I considered at the end of section 2.
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5. It is not an easy task to give an exact definition for what counts as an evolution-
ary explanation, but what I mean by this concept is quite broad: an evolutionary 
explanation is an explanation where the explanandum can be pretty much anything 
(although most of the time it is the apparent teleology of a property), but the 
explanans is an evolutionary process. Evolutionary processes, in turn, are defined 
conjunctively to include selection, founding effect, etc.
6. To give an example of a property-type that is considered to be a good candidate 
for a property that all and only members of a species have in all possible worlds: 
the property of being a member of a population with such and such distinctive 
evolutionary history (Griffiths 1999; Okasha 2002; the idea, again, comes from the 
anti-essentialist Matthen 1998). But everything this property-type can explain can 
be explained by individual-level processes, such as the specific evolutionary history 
of a specific organism, without appealing to any trait-types.
7. Richard Boyd argued that we can give an even weaker formulation of essential-
ism than the one we have considered so far. More precisely, essentialism does not 
necessarily imply that all and only the members of a natural kind must have a 
kind-specific essence. According to his “homeostatic property cluster theory,” the 
members of a kind share a cluster of similar properties, but no property is neces-
sary for membership in this kind (Boyd 1999). Boyd’s “homeostatic property cluster 
theory” is quite complex and I do not intend to give a definitive argument against 
it. But we may be able to use the considerations above to make the following 
conditional claim. Boyd explicitly states that “the homeostatic clustering of proper-
ties . . . is causally important” (1999, 143). If this is to be understood in such a 
way that it is also explanatorily relevant, and if the “homeostatic clustering of 
properties” is supposed to be understood as a type that can have a number of dif-
ferent token instantiations, then Boyd’s view contradicts the considerations I pre-
sented above in favor of the claim that property-types play no role in biological 
explanations.
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